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Schweitzer: Lane v. Franks

LANE V. FRANKS: THE SUPREME COURT CLARIFIES
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
Thomas A. Schweitzer*
On June 19, 2014, the United States Supreme Court decided
an important First Amendment case concerning the free speech rights
of government employees.1 While public employees speaking as citizens on issues of public concern have the same right to freedom of
speech as other citizens when they speak on matters of public concern, the Court has held that when they make statements pursuant to
their official duties, they must accept certain limitations on their freedom of speech.2 In Lane v. Franks, the Court unanimously rejected
the extreme position of the Eleventh Circuit, which had held that a
public official had no remedy when he was fired in retaliation for
turning in a “no show” office holder who was tried, convicted and
imprisoned.3
While two other appellate courts had conferred broader protection on public employees’ free speech rights in similar cases, there
were only a handful of such cases.4 However, Lane’s actions, which
presumably led to his termination, manifestly promoted the public interest in combatting government corruption.5 Thus, the lower courts’
position that Lane had suffered no remediable wrong, evidently convinced all the justices that prompt action was required to set the Eleventh Circuit straight.6
*

Professor of Law, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center of Touro College. The original version
of this article was published as a two part series in the Suffolk Lawyer, in November and
December of 2014. This version contains footnotes and updated text.
1
Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2374-75 (2014).
2
Id. at 2383.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 2377; see Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) and City of San Diego v.
Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004).
5
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006)).
6
Id. at 2376-77.
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LANE V. FRANKS IN THE LOWER COURTS

Edward Lane was the Director of the Community Intensive
Training for Youth, (“CITY”), that was located at a public community college in Alabama.7 Upon discovering that Alabama State Representative Suzanne Schmitz was on CITY’s payroll in what amounted
to a “no show” job, Lane confronted Schmitz and ordered her to report for work, but she refused.8 Lane subsequently fired the recalcitrant Schmitz, despite having been warned by the college president,
Steve Franks, that this could have negative repercussions for him and
the college.9 Schmitz told a fellow employee that she intended to
“get [Lane] back” for firing her.10
After the FBI investigated, Lane testified before a federal
grand jury about his reasons for firing Schmitz.11 Schmitz was indicted and convicted on seven felony counts in a federal trial at which
Lane, pursuant to a subpoena, testified against her.12 She was sentenced to thirty months in prison and ordered to make restitution of
over $177,000.13 Franks then fired Lane, who sued him under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that his termination was in retaliation for testifying against Schmitz and violated his First Amendment rights.14
The Federal District Court of the Northern District of Alabama granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Franks.15 The
court held that Franks was protected by qualified immunity for the
individual claims against him, and the Eleventh Amendment barred
the claims against him in his official capacity.16 The court also concluded that because Lane had learned about Schmitz’s criminal conduct while working as a government official, his testimony that
brought Schmitz to justice could be considered “as part of his official
job duties and not made as a citizen on a matter of public concern.”17

7

Id. at 2375.
Id.
9
Id.
10
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 2376.
15
Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., No. CV-11-BE-0883, 2012 WL 5289412, at *6 (N.D.
Ala. Oct. 18, 2012).
16
Id. at *12.
17
Id. at *10.
8
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The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in a per curiam opinion affirmed this decision, concluding that the First Amendment did not
protect Lane’s statements.18
The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to resolve discord
among the Courts of Appeals as to whether public employees may be
fired—or suffer other adverse employment consequences—for
providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the course of their
ordinary job responsibilities.”19
II.

PRIOR SUPREME COURT CASES ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’
FREE SPEECH RIGHTS: PICKERING, CONNICK, AND GARCETTI

The Supreme Court has long held that special rules apply to
government employees’ free speech rights.20 Public employees do
not forfeit their free speech rights when they take government jobs,
but efficient operation of the government requires that it maintain a
“significant degree of control over [its] employees’ words and actions”21 in the exercise of their official duties. However, “[s]peech by
citizens on matters of public concern lies at the heart of the First
Amendment . . . .”22
In the leading case of Pickering v. Board of Education,23 the
Board of Education fired Marvin Pickering, a public high school
teacher, after his letter criticizing the Board’s handling of proposed
bond issues and tax increases was published in a local newspaper.24
He sued, and the Illinois lower courts and its supreme court rejected
his First Amendment arguments.25 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing that school finance issues were matters of public
concern on which the Superintendent of Schools and teachers groups
had published a number of articles in the newspaper.26 The Court
stated that if matters of public concern are at issue, then even criti18

Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 F. App’x 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377.
20
Id. at 2374; see Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., 391
U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
21
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
22
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377.
23
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
24
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
25
Id. at 565; see Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 225 N.E.2d 1 (Ill.
1967), rev’d, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
26
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572, 575.
19
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cism by public employees of their superiors deserves First Amendment protection.27
The Supreme Court later cut back on public employees’ free
speech protection in Connick v. Myers28 and Garcetti v. Ceballos.29
The Court in Connick held that the speech of a government employee, which led to her firing, was not constitutionally protected because
it involved personnel matters rather than issues of public concern.30
Assistant district attorney Myers, who was upset about being
transferred to a different department, distributed to her colleagues a
questionnaire about office morale and the need for a grievance committee.31 District Attorney Connick32 fired her for insubordination,33
and the Court upheld this 5-4.34 Reversing the Fifth Circuit and the
district court, the Court observed that the district attorney could reasonably believe that the questionnaire would undermine his authority
and disrupt close working relationships in the office.35 It noted that
federal court was not the appropriate forum in which to review the
wisdom of a personnel action, which was not a matter of public concern.36
Garcetti involved a similar claim by a deputy district attorney,
who alleged in court that he had suffered retaliation for his performance of his duties.37 As “calendar deputy,” Ceballos had to review
search warrants when requested to by defense attorneys.38 In a criminal case, he found that a deputy sheriff’s affidavit in support of a
search warrant contained allegations which he did not find credible.39
He wrote a memorandum to his superiors questioning the affidavit.40
However, neither the affiant nor Ceballos’s supervisors agreed with
27

Id. at 574.
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
29
547 U.S. 410 (2006).
30
Connick, 461 U.S. at 148-49.
31
Id. at 141.
32
Father of the jazz musician, Harry Connick, Jr.
See Connick, Harry Jr.,
ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Harry_Jr._Connick.aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2015).
33
Connick, 431 U.S. at 141.
34
Id. at 154.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 147.
37
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415.
38
Id. at 413.
39
Id. at 414.
40
Id.
28
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him, and they proceeded with the prosecution.41 Ceballos recounted
his observations about the affidavit at a court hearing.42 He was then
reassigned, transferred to another courthouse and denied a promotion,
actions which he regarded as retaliatory.43
Since Ceballos had written his memorandum questioning the
affidavit in the course of his employment duties, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of his adversaries.44 The Ninth
Circuit reversed on the ground that Ceballos’s memorandum, which
recited what he regarded as government misconduct, was inherently a
matter of public concern.45
The Supreme Court reversed 5-4 in an opinion by Justice
Kennedy.46 Since Ceballos had written his memorandum as part of
his regular duties as a prosecutor, the Court held that he was not protected against discipline because “when public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”47 To hold otherwise, as the Ninth Circuit had done, would
mean the unwarranted displacement of the managerial discretion
which supervisors need to do their job, and its replacement by intrusive judicial supervision, which would disrupt official business.48
Acknowledging that cases in which government employees
sued alleging retaliatory termination were not straightforward, the
Court stated that courts must first determine whether the employee
spoke on a subject of public concern.49 If yes, the courts must decide
whether the government entity was justified in “treating the employee
differently from any other member of the general public.”50 Whether
the speech in question was on a matter of public concern depended on
whether it occurred in the workplace and whether it was made pursu41

Id.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414.
43
Id. at 414-15.
44
Id. at 414; see Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. CV0011106AHMAJWX, 2002 WL 34098285,
at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002).
45
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415-16; see Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir.
2004).
46
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426.
47
Id. at 421.
48
See id. at 411.
49
Id. at 418 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).
50
Id. (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).
42
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ant to the public employee’s job duties.51
III.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN LANE V. FRANKS

Applying the Garcetti test, the district court in Lane noted
that while Lane’s testimony against Schmitz at the grand jury and at
trial did not occur in the workplace, Lane had learned of its substance
while serving in his official capacity as Director at CITY.52 Thus, the
court concluded that Lane’s speech was made as part of his official
job duties as Director of CITY and not made as a citizen on a matter
of public concern.53 Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants.54 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion, while noting that courts in the Seventh and Third Circuits had reached the opposite conclusion and had conferred First
Amendment protection on public employees’ deposition testimony.55
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Sotomayor, reversed the lower courts, both of which had held that the
mere fact that Lane had testified pursuant to subpoenas at the Grand
Jury and at Schmitz’s trial did not necessarily make his speech a matter of public concern.56 The Court had granted certiorari to consider
“whether the First Amendment protects a public employee who provided truthful sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside the
course of his ordinary job responsibilities.”57 The Court’s answer:
“We hold that it does.”58
Citing 18 U.S.C. § 1623, which criminalizes false statements
under oath in judicial proceedings, the Court noted that the obligation
to testify truthfully while under oath “is a quintessential example of
speech as a citizen . . . .”59 The Court acknowledged that when testifying under oath pursuant to a subpoena, “a public employee . . . may
bear separate obligations to his employer . . . . But any such obligations as an employee are distinct and independent from the obliga-

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418-19.
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376; Lane, 2012 WL 5289412, at *10.
See supra note 51.
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376; Lane, 2012 WL 5289412, at *6.
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2383; see Lane, 523 F. App’x at 712 n.3.
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2383.
Id. at 2378.
Id.
Id. at 2379.
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tion, as a citizen, to speak the truth.”60 Thus, “[i]n holding that Lane
did not speak as a citizen when he testified, the Eleventh Circuit read
Garcetti far too broadly.”61
The Court noted that government policies are of interest to the
public at large, and public employees “are uniquely qualified to
comment” on such matters because of what they learn on the job.62
Moreover, employee speech is especially important in the context of
a public corruption scandal;63 there are more than 1000 prosecutions
for federal corruption offenses annually, and they often require testimony by other government employees.64 Obviously, corruption on
the part of public officials is a vital matter of public concern, and it
would be perverse if public employees, speaking publicly to disclose
wrongdoing and thereby serving the public interest, could be fired
with impunity, and be without the remedy of a retaliation claim based
on violation of their free speech rights. The government defendants
in Lane were unable to cite any governmental interest that would
counter-balance Lane’s free speech rights on “the Pickering scale.”65
IV.

COMMENTARY

The Eleventh Circuit in Lane had taken a literal, doctrinaire
view of Garcetti, which led to an outrageous result.66 The public has
60

Id.
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379.
62
Id. at 2379-80 (quoting Roe, 543 U.S. at 80).
63
Id. at 2380. Justice Souter, dissenting in Garcetti, disagreed with the majority’s “categorical den[ial] of Pickering protection to any speech uttered ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’
” 547 U.S. at 430 (quoting id. at 421). He noted that Pickering recognized that “public employees are often the members of the community who are likely to have informed opinions
as to the operations of their public employers, operations which are of substantial concern to
the public. . . .” Id. at 433. Seemingly anticipating the very problem later posed by Lane v.
Franks, he emphasized that “the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion” and “the
employee’s own right to disseminate it . . . [are] . . . not a whit less true when an employee’s
job duties require him to speak about such things: when for example, a public auditor speaks
on his discovery of embezzlement of public funds . . . .” Id. (quoting Roe, 543 U.S. at 82).
And while an auditor may discover such embezzlement in the course of his official duties,
the public interest in publicizing it is no less implicated when an official like Lane accidentally stumbles on it while performing an administrative role. If the majority in Garcetti
had paid heed to this caution by Justice Souter rather than categorically denying Pickering
protection to speech by public employees performing their official duties, the misapprehension by the Eleventh Circuit of the legal principle involved and the entire litigation of Lane
v. Franks might have been avoided.
64
Lane, 134 S. Ct at 2380.
65
Id. at 2381.
66
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376-78; Lane, 523 F. App’x at 710-12.
61
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an interest in identifying, exposing, and prosecuting criminals; thus, it
is not surprising that the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision.67 The Supreme Court sent a clear message that its jurisprudence limiting the free speech rights of public
employees could no longer be used to shield vindictive scoundrels
like Schmitz, or to leave those who expose them and are dismissed in
reprisal without a legal remedy.68
I believe that the unanimous decision in Lane is obviously
correct. However, the contrary argument is that the entire case was
unnecessary, and the Supreme Court in Garcetti may have invited the
extreme and unacceptable Eleventh Circuit approach, which it unceremoniously uprooted in Lane. It left itself open for such an approach
when Justice Kennedy stated flatly in Garcetti: “We hold that when
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties,
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline.”69
While the precise scope of public employees’ “official duties”
may be debatable, this rather absolute statement is susceptible of the
extreme interpretation placed on it by the Eleventh Circuit.70 After
Lane, it is plain that this statement can no longer be taken literally.
The Supreme Court apparently has qualified it by implication, but it
would have been preferable and more candid if the Court had done so
explicitly.
In any event, the jurisprudence of Garcetti and Connick, both
decided by bare majorities, has imposed on federal courts the challenging and unnecessarily complex task of determining whether a
particular public employee’s utterances were made as part of her official duties or otherwise.71 I agree with Justices Stevens and Souter
who anticipated such difficulties in their dissents in Garcetti. As Justice Stevens stated, “[t]he notion that there is a categorical difference
between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the course of one’s
employment is quite wrong.”72 He felt it was “senseless” to let constitutional protection for the same words depend on whether they fell
67
68
69
70
71
72

Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380-81.
Id. at 2380.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376-77; Lane, 523 F. App’x at 711 n.2.
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423-25; Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-51.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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within a job description, and that it was “perverse” to adopt a rule
that gives employees an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before talking frankly with their superiors.73 Surely, the convoluted
analyses made necessary by the Garcetti decision and the resultant
legal confusion anticipated by Justices Stevens and Souter should
have and would have been avoided if the result in Garcetti had been
4-5 instead of 5-4.

73

Id.
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